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CONTROLLING MEDICARE COSTS: MOVING BEYOND INEPT 
ADMINISTERED PRICING AND ERSATZ COMPETITION 
THOMAS L. GREANEY* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Medicare has been at the epicenter of deficit reduction and health 
reform discussions for many years. Controlling Medicare spending figured 
prominently in the government “shutdown” and President Clinton’s veto of a 
Medicare voucher plan in 1995,1 the ill-fated “grand bargain” discussed 
during the debt extension crisis of 2011,2 the debate over enactment of the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA),3 and most recently negotiations about avoiding 
the “fiscal cliff.”4 This debate, to the extent it can be labeled as such, has 
been vacuous. Much has focused on whether premium support plans will 
deprive seniors of choice and financial security in their healthcare decisions. 
Other reform proposals, such as raising the eligibility age for Medicare 
beneficiaries, restricting Medigap coverage, and indiscriminately reducing 
provider reimbursement, are questionable from a deficit-reduction 
standpoint and detrimental in their collateral effects on access and equity. 
Missing from the discussion has been a serious treatment of how and how 
much providers should be paid. (Yes, “paid,” not “reimbursed;” the 
unspoken and politically discomforting fact is that “cost control” necessarily 
spells lower incomes for many in the healthcare sector.) Proponents and 
opponents of market-based reform consistently fail to acknowledge the 
prerequisites of reducing the price and volume of services through private 
bargaining between payers (government or commercial) and providers and 
sellers of medical devices, pharmaceuticals, and supplies. Likewise, those 
 
* Chester A. Myers Professor of Law and Co-Director, Center for Health Law Studies, Saint 
Louis University School of Law. 
 1. Jonathan Oberlander, The Politics of Medicare Reform, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1095, 
1120 (2003). 
 2. Jeanne Sahadi, Debt Ceiling: Perils of a ‘Grand Bargain’, CNNMONEY (July 8, 
2011), http://money.cnn.com/2011/07/08/news/economy/debt_ceiling/index.html. 
 3. Robert A. Berenson, Implementing Health Care Reform – Why Medicare Matters, 363 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 101, 101 (2010). 
 4. Josh Boak, Medicare May Be a Silent Killer in Budget Battles, FISCAL TIMES (Dec. 20, 
2012), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2012/12/20/Medicare-May-Be-the-Silent-Kill 
er-in-Budget-Battles.aspx#page1. 
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who support retaining traditional Medicare tend to ignore the grievous flaws 
of administered pricing and the government’s repeatedly unsuccessful 
attempts at reform. 
This essay seeks to refocus the discussion. Acknowledging that 
controlling Medicare spending is an important national priority, it deals with 
the core problem of rationalizing cost in a market-based system. Part II 
critiques the premium support proposal that figured prominently in the 2012 
Presidential campaign, revealing the flawed assumptions that undermine 
reliance on purported market efficiency. Part III looks at the bête noire of 
provider payment under Medicare, fee-for-service (FFS) methodology, and 
the ineffective governmental efforts at administered pricing. The article next 
reviews the flaws in the design and administration of the managed care 
options offered to Medicare beneficiaries. Finally, it concludes by discussing 
the reforms embodied in the ACA, finding a ray of hope in its efforts to 
adjust provider payments in a way that potentially will transform healthcare 
delivery. 
II.  PREMIUM SUPPORT 
2012 was a year in which Medicare dominated political and legislative 
discourse as never before. Concerns over the fiscal threat posed by growing 
expenditures and rising eligibility for the Medicare program focused national 
attention on proposals to “reform” Medicare. Although just two years earlier 
Congress had debated and ultimately made important changes to the 
program in enacting the ACA, the 2012 Presidential campaign brought the 
issue of cost control into sharp relief. For the most part, the debate centered 
on the “premium support” proposal advanced by Vice Presidential 
candidate Paul Ryan, a reform that had twice passed the House of 
Representatives5 and had been advanced for a number of years by groups 
examining ways to deal with the nation’s budgetary problems.6 
 
 5. In 2011 and 2012, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 2 and H.R. 6079 
respectively, which would adopt premium support for Medicare and repeal the ACA. Letter 
from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to John Boehner, Speaker, U.S. 
House of Rep. (July 24, 2012). Neither bill was acted upon by the Senate. For a list of other 
legislative proposals, see KAISER FAMILY FOUND., COMPARISON OF MEDICARE PREMIUM SUPPORT 
PROPOSALS (2012), available at http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/8284.pdf. 
 6. The National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility, often referred to as the Simpson 
Bowles Commission from the names of its chairmen, Alan Simpson and Erskine Bowles, had 
proposed deficit reductions from Medicare by reforming the Sustainable Growth Rate 
mechanism, increasing cost sharing, restricting first dollar coverage in Medigap plans, and 
reducing provider payments. See NATIONAL COMM’N ON FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY AND REFORM, 
THE MOMENT OF TRUTH 35-45 (2010), available at http://www.fiscalcommission.gov/sites/fis 
calcommission.gov/files/documents/TheMomentofTruth12_1_2010.pdf. The Bipartisan Policy 
Center’s Debt Reduction Task Force, chaired by Senator Pete Dominici and Dr. Alice Rivlin, 
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The broad outlines of the premium support are as follows.7 It would 
replace Medicare’s guarantee to pay for all defined medical benefits. 
Instead, beneficiaries would receive a fixed allowance (“voucher” for those 
less sympathetic to the concept) that would be used to purchase a health 
plan from commercial insurers. Vouchers would vary by age, health status, 
and, to some not specified extent, by the income of the recipient. 
Controversially, increases in the voucher would be pegged to increases in 
the GDP, not medical expense inflation. Medicare beneficiaries would shop 
on a new Medicare exchange, presumably a virtual marketplace akin to the 
exchanges that the ACA establishes for private insurance (notwithstanding 
the fact that the Romney-Ryan agenda promised repeal of that legislation8). 
As outlined in the latest iteration, the Ryan proposal contained an important 
change for traditional, FFS Medicare. Private plans would not only compete 
with each other under a bidding system, but also will in some sense 
“compete” with traditional FFS Medicare. Because there is no traditional FFS 
entity that could submit a “bid,” the proposal presumably contemplated that 
the overall provider rates in each region would be reduced to the extent that 
the costs of traditional Medicare exceed the bids of the second lowest bid 
among private plans. 
At the heart of Congressman Ryan’s plan is a fairly straightforward 
proposition. By exercising their judgment as consumers — choosing private 
health plans and shopping for cost-effective high quality providers in their 
plans — Medicare beneficiaries can curb overuse of care, spur improve-
 
proposed substantial increases in Medicare Part B premiums and cost sharing, and converting 
Medicare into a premium support system. BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR., RESTORING AMERICA’S FUTURE 
17 (2010), available at http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/bpc%20final%20report% 
20for%20printer%2002%2028%2011.pdf. 
 7. The original legislative agenda put forth by Congressman Ryan, labeled “A Roadmap 
For America’s Future,” proposed to repeal most of the central features of the ACA, including 
subsidies for insurance purchases, insurance exchanges, and requirements that businesses 
provide insurance and that individuals buy it. See PAUL RYAN, A ROAD MAP FOR AMERICA’S FUTURE 
(2010), available at http://roadmap.republicans.budget.house.gov/uploadedfiles/roadmap2 
final2.pdf. Congressman Ryan amended his plan somewhat early in December 2011, when he 
introduced a “framework” for Medicare reform co-sponsored by Democratic Senator Ron 
Wyden. Unlike the voucher program contained in the original Ryan plan, which gave seniors a 
fixed amount of money to purchase health plans, the Wyden-Ryan plan would adjust premium 
support payments each year to reflect the actual cost of health insurance premiums. See RON 
WYDEN & PAUL RYAN, GUARANTEED CHOICES TO STRENGTHEN MEDICARE AND HEALTH SECURITY 
FOR ALL: BIPARTISAN OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE (2011), available at http://www.wyden.senate. 
gov/imo/media/doc/wyden-ryan.pdf. 
 8. Timothy Jost, Dismantling the Affordable Care Act: What Could A President Romney 
and Hill Republicans Do?, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Sept. 20, 2012), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/ 
2012/09/20/dismantling-the-affordable-care-act-what-could-a-president-romney-and-hill-
republicans-do/. 
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ments in the delivery of healthcare, and ultimately lower the cost of the 
program. Less widely noted is a necessary corollary of the Ryan plan: If the 
behavior of Medicare beneficiaries is not successful in lowering costs, 
medical inflation will be largely shifted to them. Looked at from this 
perspective it should be evident that the Ryan plan privatizes enormous 
financial risk, and the bearer of that new burden is a large and vulnerable 
sector of society. While the proposal raises abundant concerns based on 
notions of equity and the implicit social contract of the Medicare program, 
the following analysis focuses on several questionable behavioral and 
economic assumptions that underlie the proposal. 
First, consider placing responsibility on the Medicare beneficiary for 
driving the health system change by her decisions as a consumer. She will 
do this at two junctures under a market-driven Medicare system. First, in 
choosing among plans, she will seek out the plan with the best network of 
providers, premium and co-payment responsibilities, and reputation for 
quality. Second, she will exercise her discretion at the point of service, that 
is, when she decides whether to seek medical care and from what type and 
what particular provider. Co-payments and deductibles are the standard 
means by which insurers encourage consumers to have an economic stake 
in the purchase of services (“skin in the game” is the unfortunate 
watchword). The assumption of premium support advocates is that seniors 
will pick plans with higher cost sharing requirements and also will be 
incentivized to shop more prudently for lower priced providers. Further, a 
fair assumption is that under premium support, private plans will follow what 
is becoming common practice in the commercial market: encouraging 
comparative shopping at the point of service by offering different co-pay 
responsibilities for providers grouped in different “tiers” and by requiring co-
payments that will discourage overuse. 
However, as the following table indicates,9 the typical Medicare 
beneficiary will make this choice under a variety of constraints. The chances 
are about 50/50 that she has income under $50,000, less than $53,000 in 
savings, and three or more chronic conditions. The probability is also that 
she has some cognitive or physical impairment and that she sees four or 
more different physicians. This data raises serious questions as to whether 
many beneficiaries will be well-positioned to make sound comparative 
judgments or to have a sufficient reservoir of resources to bear substantial 
co-payments based solely on the expected health benefits from treatment. 
  
 
 9. KAREN DAVIS, COMMONWEALTH FUND., THE FUTURE OF MEDICARE: CONVERTING TO 
PREMIUM SUPPORT OR CONTINUING AS A GUARANTEED BENEFIT PROGRAM 22 (2012), available at 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Testimony/2012/Oct/Davis_
HouseDems_Medicare_testimony_10022012_FINAL.pdf. 
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Note also the highly skewed distribution of Medicare costs: 77% of all 
Medicare program expenditures are spent on 19.4% of beneficiaries while 
69% of all beneficiaries spent less than $5,000 per year on out-of-pocket 
costs.10 This fact has profound implications for both the effectiveness and 
equity of premium support. First consider the incentives facing beneficiaries 
with multiple chronic conditions. Proponents of premium support promise to 
place stop loss caps on beneficiaries’ financial responsibilities at levels 
around $6,000 per year. Consequently, beneficiaries with serious illnesses 
or chronic diseases would be likely to exceed cost sharing caps quickly and 
thus be relatively immune to cost sharing incentives.11 Further, the overall 
impact of these incentives is questionable. If those with less than $10,000 in 
costs reduce their spending by 20% — a very significant and probably 
unrealistic reduction — the total reduction to Medicare costs would only be 
5%.12 Second, the impact of premium support would be highly 
discriminatory; geographic variation in Medicare costs would produce 
significant variations in the burden borne by seniors in different regions. The 
Kaiser Family Foundation estimates that half of current FFS beneficiaries and 
 
 10. ROBERT A. BERENSON & JOHN HOLAHAN, URBAN INST., PRESERVING MEDICARE: A 
PRACTICAL APPROACH TO CONTROLLING SPENDING 4-5 (2011), available at http://www.urban. 
org/uploadedpdf/412405-Preserving-Medicare-A-Practical-Approach-to-Controlling-
Spending.pdf. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 5. 
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most beneficiaries enrolled in Medicare Advantage plans would pay more 
under the Ryan premium support plan if implemented today and that there 
would be tremendous regional variations in costs.13 Finally, recent research 
concerning how Medicare beneficiaries comparative shop for managed 
care services adds additional grounds for questioning the efficacy of 
premium support. For example, a study by Heiss et al. finds that fewer than 
10% of Medicare beneficiaries enroll in the Part D pharmacy plan that 
would be the most cost-effective plan for them.14 Using data on plan choice, 
drug use, health conditions, out of pocket costs, and premiums, the authors 
found enrollees lose an average of about $300 per year. The study also 
suggests that seniors pay more attention to premiums than plan generosity, 
thus miscalculating the ultimate cost they would bear.15 Other studies show 
that seniors rarely shift once they have chosen a plan; they are only half as 
likely to change MA plans as federal employees.16 
A second ground for skepticism about the efficacy of premium support 
proposals is based on what we know about healthcare provider markets. 
Inasmuch as the premium support model depends on competitive provider 
markets to promote cost efficiency, much depends on the vigor of market 
competition. A large body of literature documents the existence, scope, and 
effects of market concentration. Meta-analysis by Vogt and Town 
demonstrates a strong correlation between hospital market concentration 
and escalating costs of health insurance: hospital consolidation in the 
1990s raised overall inpatient prices by at least 5%, and by 40% or more 
when merging hospitals were located close to one another.17 An important 
study undertaken by the Massachusetts Attorney General documents the 
effects of provider leverage on healthcare costs and insurance premiums,18 
notably finding prices for health services are uncorrelated with quality, 
complexity, proportion of government patients, or academic status, but 
 
 13. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., TRANSFORMING MEDICARE INTO A PREMIUM SUPPORT SYSTEM: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR BENEFICIARY PREMIUMS 20-24 (2012). 
 14. Florian Heiss et al., Plan Selection in Medicare Part D: Evidence from Administrative 
Data 25 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18166, 2012). 
 15. Id. 
 16. See, e.g., Chao Zhou et al., The Vast Majority of Medicare Part D Beneficiaries Still 
Don’t Choose the Cheapest Plans that Meet their Medication Needs, 31 HEALTH AFF. 2259, 
2263 (2012); Zirui Song et al., Potential Consequences of Reforming Medicare Into a 
Competitive Bidding System, 308 JAMA 459, 460 (2012). 
 17. WILLIAM B. VOGT & ROBERT TOWN, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., HOW HAS 
HOSPITAL CONSOLIDATION AFFECTED THE PRICE AND QUALITY OF HOSPITAL CARE? 4 (2006), 
available at http://www.rwjf.org/files/research/no9researchreport.pdf. 
 18. MA. ATTORNEY GENERAL, EXAMINATION OF HEALTH CARE COST TRENDS AND COST 
DRIVERS PURSUANT TO G.L. C. 118G, § 6½(b) (2010) [hereinafter HEALTH CARE COST TRENDS], 
available at http://www.mass.gov/ago/docs/healthcare/final-report-w-cover-appendices-glos 
sary.pdf. 
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instead are positively correlated with provider market power.19 It concludes 
that the single most important cause of price escalation was “provider 
leverage.”20 Another report, drawing on site visits by the Center for Studying 
Health System Change to six California markets in 2008, found that 
provider leverage has had a major impact on California premium trends.21 
Private plans will inevitably face essentially the same difficulty in negotiating 
with entrenched, “must have” providers. 
In sum, the bottom line for Ryan’s premium support plan is that (1) 
commercial payers will lack power to effectively bargain with providers 
whose costs drive the healthcare inflationary spiral and (2) seniors, as 
consumers, will exert only weak pressure on the demand side. Are there 
viable alternative strategies? Provider payment and beneficiary incentives 
are the key to controlling costs, whether we are in a market-driven system, 
the traditional FFS Medicare payment methodology, or some mix of the two. 
The following sections review the leading alternatives for successfully 
constraining these costs. 
III.  CONTROLLING FEE-FOR-SERVICE PAYMENTS 
Over its nearly 50 year history, Medicare has been subject to a series of 
adjustments that attempt to deal with the serious deficiencies inherent in FFS 
payment. Paying physicians, and in some cases facilities, based on each 
procedure they perform is the bête noire of the system.22 By rewarding 
providers for the volume of service without regard to quality or outcomes, 
FFS payment skews incentives and inexorably raises costs. While Medicare 
does pay hospitals prospectively based on DRG bundles for hospitalization, 
e.g., hip replacement or craniotomy, that methodology also fails to cover 
entire episodes of care or bundle physician care and other services. Further, 
prospective payment does not reward or penalize providers based on quality 
or outcomes. Indeed, the empirical evidence suggests that Medicare 
geographic areas with higher volume do not have better outcomes.23 
Some of the changes in Medicare payment over the years that sought to 
redirect incentives, such as the shift to prospective payment for hospitals 
 
 19. Id. at 16-33. 
 20. Id. at 28. 
 21. Robert Berenson et al., Unchecked Provider Clout in California Foreshadows 
Challenges to Health Reform, 29 HEALTH AFF. 699, 704 (2010). 
 22. Reforming the Health Care Delivery System: Hearing before the Comm. on Energy & 
Commerce, 109th Cong. 5 (2009) (statement of Glenn B. Hackbarth, Chairman, MedPAC) 
[hereinafter Hackbarth statement]; see generally Harold Miller, From Volume to Value: Better 
Ways to Pay for Health Care, 28 HEALTH AFF. 1418 (2009) (suggesting that barriers that 
prevent Medicare from improving quality and controlling costs stem from the fee-for-service 
payment system). 
 23. Hackbarth statement, supra note 22, at 5. 
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under the inpatient prospective payment system (IPPS), have been 
moderately successful.24 Paying one price for a defined bundle of services 
provided per hospital admission lowered hospital costs by reducing lengths 
of stay and encouraging to some extent conservation of health resources.25 
However, IPPS has necessitated close regulatory supervision and reform to 
deal with problems associated with a host of complexities including 
adjustments to account for wage differentials, new technology, case severity 
differences, upcoding by providers, and a variety of other factors.26 
Moreover, enthusiasm based on the IPPS success story should be tempered 
by considering the larger picture. As discussed infra, there is some evidence 
that Medicare hospital payments induce cost-shifting to private payers, 
although the degree and direction of shifting depends on the balance of 
market power between hospitals and health plans.27 In addition, IPPS adds 
enormous administrative complexity to what is ultimately a process for 
setting a global budget. Further, it does so without adjusting for quality or 
outcomes among hospitals, paying the best and worst hospitals the same 
base payment regardless of performance (leading one former CMS 
administrator to call his agency a “big dumb price fixer”28). 
Other reforms such as paying physicians using the Resource Based 
Relative Value Scale (RBRVS) have been notorious failures because of 
inadequate controls over the volume of services and the disparity in payment 
between specialty and primary care services. The Medicare Physician Fee 
Schedule — which employs the RBRVS methodology adopted under the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 — put in place a scale for 
differentiating the levels of payments to physicians under Medicare based on 
 
 24. Id. at 12-13. 
 25. See Stuart Altman, The Lessons of Medicare’s Prospective Payment System Show That 
the Bundled Payment Program Faces Challenges, 31 HEALTH AFF. 1923, 1928 (2012). 
 26. See id. at 1927 (explaining DRG system failure to reflect severity of illness resulting in 
overpayments and underpayments and necessitating increase from 538 DRGs to nearly 1000 
groupings); David Frankford, The Complexity of Medicare’s Hospital Reimbursement System: 
Paradoxes of Averaging, 78 IOWA L. REV. 517, 577-78 (1993); see MEDICARE PAYMENT 
ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: PROMOTING GREATER EFFICIENCY IN MEDICARE 36 
(2007), available at http://www.medpac.gov/documents/Jun07_entirereport.pdf; 
see generally CCH, 2011 MEDICARE EXPLAINED (Pam Carron et al. eds., 2011). 
 27. See Austin B. Frakt, How Much Do Hospitals Cost-Shift? A Review of the Evidence, 89 
MILBANK Q. 90 (2011); Allen Dobson et al., The Cost-Shift Payment ‘Hydraulic’: Foundation, 
History, and Implication, 25 HEALTH AFF. 22, 27 (2006); Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Many Prices 
Paid to Providers and the Flawed Theory of Cost Shifting: Is It Time For a More Radical All-
Payer System?, 30 HEALTH AFF. 2125, 2127 (2011). 
 28. Uwe Reinhardt, The Medicare World From Both Sides: A Conversation with Tom 
Scully, 22 HEALTH AFF. 167, 168 (2003). 
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the complexity, costs, and other factors for each procedure.29 It was left to 
Congress to update the multiplier (conversion factor) for these value scales 
to determine what physicians would be paid. Congress came up with an 
astonishingly naïve mechanism, the Volume Performance Standard (VPS), to 
control the volume or intensity of services provided. As originally designed, 
the VPS sought to discourage physicians from overusing services by reducing 
per service payment levels if overall volume increases exceeded a specified 
threshold.30 This approach ignored the patent collective action problem: 
there was simply no reason for an individual physician to reduce the volume 
of services based on a net reduction in per service payment levels nationally 
or even regionally.31 
A few years later, CMS upped the ante by adopting the Sustainable 
Growth Rate (SGR) formula which imposes cumulative forced reductions in 
physician payments when total physician spending exceeds a fixed spending 
amount.32 That is, if the total spending on physician services in a given year 
exceeds an aggregate target based on the GDP and other factors, the 
formula requires recouping that excess spending by reducing fee levels the 
next year. Besides ignoring the collective action problem, the SGR process 
was doubly naïve in failing to anticipate Congress’s response to proposed 
reductions in physician incomes resulting from the process. In each year 
since 2001 except one, Congress has passed legislation that overrode fee 
reductions, with the result that as of 2012, absent another override, 
physician fees would decline by 29.5%.33 Another critical flaw of Medicare 
physician payment has been its failure to satisfy the central goal of the 
RBRVS experiment: rationalizing payment to reward cognitive services and 
reducing overpayments to procedure-oriented practices. Owing to its 
reliance on the American Medical Association’s Relative Value Update 
 
 29. BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD ASS’N, RESOURCE BASED RELATIVE VALUE SCALE 1-2 (2009), 
available at https://www.bcbsal.org/providers/newpaymentmethodology/RBRVSEducation.pdf. 
 30. Physician Payments: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm on 
Ways & Means, 107th Cong. 11 (2002) (statement of Dan L. Crippen, Dir., Cong. Budget 
Office). 
 31. See MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: ASSESSING 
ALTERNATIVES TO THE SUSTAINABLE GROWTH RATE SYSTEM 205 (2007), available at 
http://www.medpac.gov/documents/Mar07_SGR_mandated_report.pdf. 
 32. Id. at 11-12. 
 33. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: MEDICARE AND THE 
HEALTH CARE DELIVERY SYSTEM 7 (2011), available at http://www.medpac.gov/documents/jun 
11_entirereport.pdf. 
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Committee, which is dominated by specialists, the process continues to 
over-weigh specialty procedures and undervalue primary care.34 
As the foregoing account suggests, FFS Medicare regulation has been 
mired in increasing administrative complexity and payment reform has failed 
to accomplish many of its key objectives. Perhaps the most damning 
criticism of FFS payment is that it has perpetuated a fragmented delivery 
system by incentivizing procedure-oriented medical practices and failing to 
reward outcomes or encourage integration.35 Moreover, Medicare-
administered pricing may play a less important role in inducing overall cost 
control than competition in commercial markets. Although administered 
pricing under Medicare does not differentiate among providers based on 
their market leverage, provider market competition has a significant effect 
on hospital Medicare margins. Examining the effect of hospital market 
concentration on Medicare payments, the Medicare Payment Advisory 
Commission (MedPAC) has found that high hospital margins on private-
payer patients tend to induce more construction and higher hospital costs 
and that, “when non-Medicare margins are high, hospitals face less 
pressure to constrain costs, [and] costs rise.”36 These factors, MedPAC 
observes, explain the counterintuitive phenomenon that hospital Medicare 
margins tend to be low in markets in which hospital market concentration is 
highest, while margins are higher in more competitively structured markets.37 
Given the government’s spotty experience with administered pricing, 
much attention has been paid to the market-based alternatives. The 
following section analyzes the performance of Medicare managed care, 
known as Medicare Advantage in its current incarnation. 
IV.  MEDICARE ADVANTAGE 
Medicare beneficiaries have had the option of enrolling in private 
HMOs since the 1970s.38 With the Balanced Budget Act of 199739 and the 
 
 34. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT 
POLICY 133-150 (2006), available at http://www.medpac.gov/documents/Mar06_entirere 
port.pdf. 
 35. See generally THE FRAGMENTATION OF THE US HEALTHCARE SYSTEM: CAUSES AND 
SOLUTIONS (Einer R. Elhauge ed., 2010). 
 36. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: ASSESSING 
ALTERNATIVES TO THE SUSTAINABLE GROWTH RATE SYSTEM xiv (2009), available at 
http://www.medpac.gov/documents/mar09_entirereport.pdf. 
 37. Id.; see also Stensland et al., Private-Payer Profits Can Induce Negative Medicare 
Margins, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1045, 1048-49 (2010). 
 38. See Robert A. Berenson & Bryan E. Dowd, Medicare Advantage Plans at a Crossroads 
– Yet Again, 28 HEALTH AFF. w29, w30 (2008). 
 39. Id. at w32. 
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Medicare Modernization Act of 2004,40 Congress successively renamed this 
option and added incentives to enhance its attractiveness to beneficiaries. 
As of the end of 2012, 27% of all Medicare beneficiaries are enrolled in the 
program now called Medicare Advantage (MA).41 With HMOs constituting 
65% of MA enrollment and PPOs representing the balance of the 
remainder, MA plans actively manage provider networks with programs 
designed to assure the delivery of Part A and B services while avoiding 
excess utilization. Operating under the budget constraint of capitated 
payments, these plans have incentives to integrate care and subject 
participating providers to financial incentives and other controls to achieve 
desired outcomes. 
The experience with MA plans is a cautionary tale illustrating the 
problems of administering a program that is neither fish nor fowl. As 
discussed below, although built around a bidding model, MA falls short of 
replicating a competitive market outcome. While many MA plans have 
proved highly successful at delivering integrated care below FFS costs with 
equal or better quality measures42 and have demonstrated the capacity to 
avoid readmissions and other cost drivers endemic in FFS Medicare,43 the 
regulatory design of benchmark bidding and several politicized regulatory 
adjustments have prevented the emergence of a fully cost-effective 
alternative. 
As originally implemented, Medicare set payment rates for managed 
care at 95% of county-level FFS costs. The underlying policy concept was 
that private plans that were more efficient and innovative than traditional 
Medicare should be able to deliver care more cost efficiently, whose savings 
could be shared with beneficiaries in the form of added benefits or reduced 
premiums. It did not work out that way. Under an earlier incarnation, 
awkwardly named Medicare + Choice, HMOs failed to deliver on promises 
of expanded choice and superior quality.44 Flawed risk adjustment policies 
 
 40. Id. at w32-w33. 
 41. MARSHA GOLD ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE ADVANTAGE 2012 DATA 
SPOTLIGHT: ENROLLMENT MARKET UPDATE 1 (2012), available at http://www.kff.org/medicare/ 
upload/8323.pdf. Some states have substantially higher enrollments. Id. at 5 (Minnesota 46%, 
Oregon 41%, Pennsylvania 38% California 36%). 
 42. Bruce E. Landon et al., Analysis of Medicare Advantage HMOs Compared with 
Traditional Medicare Shows Lower Use of Many Services During 2003-2009, 31 HEALTH AFF. 
2609, 2609 (2012). 
 43. Marsha Gold, Medicare Advantage – Lessons for Medicare’s Future, 366 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 1174, 1175 (2012); Jeff Lumieux et al., Hospital Readmission Rates in Medicare 
Advantage Plans, 18 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 96, 103 (2012). 
 44. Marsha Gold, Medicare+Choice: An Interim Report Card, HEALTH AFF. , July 2001, at 
120, 126 (cataloguing shortcomings of program following passage of the Balanced Budget 
Act of 1997). 
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allowed plans to earn more than the 95% standard because of their ability 
to obtain healthier than average beneficiary cohorts.45 However 
Congressional reaction under the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, which 
caused Medicare growth to slow, caused many plans to withdraw from 
Medicare or abandon less profitable geographic areas.46 In 2004, 
Congress overreacted again — this time in the opposite direction — when it 
adopted the Medicare Modernization Act.47 Renaming the program 
“Medicare Advantage,” the Act added regional PPOs and private FFS plans 
to expand the availability of MA plans to previously unserved or underserved 
areas,48 and adopted bidding and risk sharing regulations, all with a 
straightforward goal: promote MA enrollment by overpaying private plans. 
The changes achieved that goal: by 2009, MA plans were receiving 
payments in excess of 114% of FFS and some of the newly-configured MA 
plans were not even designed to provide integrated care.49 
Now this was all wrong for the self-evident reason that overpayments to 
HMOs do not accomplish the goal of saving money. But in addition, 
overpayments suffer from a dynamic flaw: they undermine incentives to 
innovate and provide care more efficiently.50 The only rationale that can be 
ascribed to Congress is the desire to turbo-charge HMO enrollments, or to 
put it bluntly, to undermine traditional Medicare. (After all, it was Newt 
Gingrich who acknowledged that a central aim of his voucher plan was to 
make traditional Medicare unattractive so that it would “wither on the 
vine.”51). Another lesson can be gleaned from understanding the historical 
context: MA plans are not inherently more expensive than FFS Medicare but 
are the inexorable product of administratively set, high benchmarks. As one 
commentary aptly put it, “We pay these plans more because we choose to 
do so.”52 
 
 45. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT 
POLICY (2002), available at http://medpac.gov/documents/Mar11_EntireReport.pdf. 
 46. BRIAN BILES ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, MEDICARE ADVANTAGE IN THE ERA OF 
HEALTH REFORM: PROGRESS IN LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD 1 (2011), available at 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Publications/Issue-Briefs/2011/Mar/Medicare-
Advantage.aspx. 
 47. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. 
108-173, 117 Stat. 2066. 
 48. See Marsha Gold, Medicare’s Private Plans: A Report Card on Medicare Advantage, 
28 HEALTH AFF. W41, W42 (2008). By 2008 all Medicare beneficiaries had multiple MA 
choices. Id. 
 49. See BILES, supra note 46, at 5. 
 50. Id. at 2. 
 51. POLITICS; Gingrich on Medicare, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 1996), http://www.nytimes. 
com/1996/07/20/us/politics-gingrich-on-medicare.html. 
 52. Jeet S. Guram & Robert E. Moffit, The Medicare Advantage Success Story – Looking 
Beyond the Cost Difference, 366 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1177, 1178 (2012). 
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Seeking to return to the concept of creating a level playing field between 
traditional Medicare and MA plans, the ACA cut back substantially — 
though not completely — on overpayments to MA plans. MA plans will be 
paid based on current payments relative to FFS payments in those counties. 
The highest paid counties will have benchmarks at 95% of FFS and the 
lowest at 115%, with the others in between, so that by 2017, CMS will set 
payments at a national average of 101% of FFS costs.53 In addition, plans 
that perform well on quality scores can offset some of the reduction with 
additional bonus payments for quality under the Star Rating program 
initiated under the ACA.54 Yet all is not perfect with this reform. CMS 
exercised its authority to establish a demonstration program allowing 
bonuses to be paid to MA plans that performed below the ACA standard of 
four stars or higher.55 This Lake Wobegone56 scoring system allowed 91% of 
plans to get bonuses,57 which essentially gives back about half of the 
projected savings from cuts to MA.58 
A closer look at the MA bidding system suggests that even with the ACA 
amendments, the process still falls short of replicating a competitive market. 
Under the current bidding system, payments to MA plans are determined by 
comparing each plan’s bid (which reflects the plan’s estimated costs) to a 
benchmark. Plans bidding below the benchmark receive their bid plus a 
"rebate" equal to 75% of the difference between the bid and the benchmark. 
Those bidding above the benchmark — a rare occurrence — receive the 
benchmark but must require that each plan enrollee pay a premium equal to 
the difference between the bid and the benchmark. The ACA adjusted the 
bidding framework by gradually lowering plan benchmarks to levels closer to 
the cost of enrollees in traditional Medicare in each county, setting relatively 
 
 53. Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to Nancy Pelosi, 
Speaker, U.S. House of Rep. (Mar. 20, 2010). 
 54. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., FACT SHEET 3-10 (2010), available at 
http://www.cms.gov/apps/docs/Fact-Sheet-2011-Landscape-for-MAe-and-Part-D-FINAL1110 
10.pdf. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Jonathan Becher, Lake Wobegon Effect, FORBES (May 21, 2012), http://www.forbes. 
com/sites/sap/2012/05/21/lake-woebegone-effect/. 
 57. Gretchen Jacobson et al., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE ADVANTAGE STAR RATING 
AND BONUS PAYMENTS IN 2012, at 5 (2011), available at http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/ 
8257.pdf. Overall, however, the Star Rating System has produced some improvements in 
quality. See Paul Cotton et al., Early Evidence Suggests Medicare Advantage Pay for 
Performance May be Getting Results, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Oct. 29, 2012), http://healthaffairs. 
org/blog/2012/10/29/early-evidence-suggests-medicare-advantage-pay-for-performance-
may-be-getting-results/. 
 58. JAMES COSGROVE & EDDA EMMANUELLI-PEREZ, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
GAO-12-964T, MEDICARE ADVANTAGE: QUALITY BONUS PAYMENT DEMONSTRATION HAS DESIGN 
FLAWS AND RAISES LEGAL CONCERNS 4 (2012). 
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lower benchmarks in counties with high FFS Medicare costs, and relatively 
higher benchmarks in counties with lower FFS costs.59 
Though an improvement over its predecessor, this bidding process falls 
short of creating effective incentives to lower costs. A central flaw is that 
benchmarks continue to be based in part on historic private plan payment 
rates and are subject to annual increases based on the growth in Medicare 
spending.60 By retaining bidding against a preset benchmark, the bidding 
process does not fully encourage plans to compete as strongly as one in 
which payments are based on the average of plans’ bids. The resulting 
misplaced economic incentives from retaining the linkage between payments 
to MA plans and spending on FFS Medicare ultimately reduce the potential 
savings that can be realized when private plans achieve lower costs than FFS 
Medicare.61 Notably the Senate version of the ACA contained a provision 
which was removed in the reconciliation process at the eleventh hour that 
would have required competitive bidding that set payments based on the 
average bid.62 
This was not the first time that Congress proved unwilling to adopt a full 
competitive bidding process for Medicare. In the 1990s, the predecessor 
agency to CMS was rebuffed by opposition in Congress in its attempt to 
establish a demonstration project for private plan competition in Baltimore, 
Maryland and in Denver, Colorado.63 Prior to enactment of the ACA, the 
Obama Administration had embraced a plan to “‘allow the market, not 
Medicare, to set [Medicare Advantage] payment rates’” by eliminating 
benchmarks based on FFS costs and instead requiring plans submitting bids 
above regional average bids make up the difference between the average 
 
 59. Under the revised bidding formula benchmarks will be 95% of fee-for-service costs per 
enrollee for the counties in the top quartile of fee-for-service costs; 100% for countries in the 
second highest quartile; 107.5% for the third highest quartile and 115% for the bottom quartile. 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3201, 24 Stat. 119, 442 
(2010) (codified as amended in § 42 U.S.C. 1395w-23(j)(2011)) [hereinafter ACA]. 
 60. See Robert A. Berenson, From Politics to Policy: A New Payment Approach in Medicare 
Advantage, 27 HEALTH AFF. w156, w160 (2008). 
 61. Guram & Moffit, supra note 52, at 1178. 
 62. See Austin Frakt, Medicare Advantage Competitive Bidding: The Political Failure of a 
Good Idea, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (April 12, 2010), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Columns/ 
2010/April/041210Frakt.aspx (speculating that removal may have been necessary to satisfy 
members of the House of Representatives who had endorsed administered pricing or were 
effectively lobbied by insurance industry representatives, or to accommodate the need for a 
more certain, favorable score for the ACA from the Congressional Budget Office). 
 63. See SUSAN JAFFE, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., COMPETITIVE BIDDING IN MEDICARE 
ADVANTAGE: IF HEALTH INSURANCE COMPANIES SUBMITTED COMPETITIVE BIDS TO OFFER MEDICARE 
COVERAGE, PRESIDENT OBAMA SAYS THE GOVERNMENT COULD SAVE BILLIONS OF DOLLARS 2 
(2009), available at http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php? brief_id=3. 
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and their bids.64 Estimated potential savings from these proposals over the 
then-existing methodology were significant. The CBO assessment of the 
proposed Policy Option issued by the Office of Management and Budget 
estimated that it would save over $175 billion over ten years.65 Initial bids in 
the Denver pilot test before Congressional action forced it to be abandoned 
were 25-38% below prevailing payment rates in the area.66 
Thus, the lessons of the flawed competitive mechanisms employed for 
MA are mixed. On the positive side, recent evidence demonstrates that MA 
plans have proved successful at delivering integrated care below FFS costs 
with equal or better quality measures.67 Further, the literature suggests that, 
on average, HMOs are slightly more efficient, with some promising 
differences in their ability to innovate in delivering services to beneficiaries 
with chronic conditions, avoid readmissions, and deal with other cost drivers 
familiar in FFS Medicare.68 As to quality of care under MA plans, a recent 
survey of the literature finds “promising results” from industry-sponsored 
studies, but in general no dramatic differences between MA plans and 
FFS.69 On the other hand, the administrative and political supervision of MA 
has been characterized by considerable inconsistency. Confusion over the 
multiple goals of MA — providing additional benefits to enrollees, reducing 
government spending, introducing competitive incentives, leveling the 
playing field — has generated a roller coaster ride of changing regulations 
and incentives for health plans and beneficiaries.70 HMOs have 
demonstrated that they can deliver cost effective care in the commercial 
sector and have had modest success in some regions in doing so under MA. 
As the national health insurance market consolidates and citizens become 
accustomed to coverage by plans, presumably many of which will also 
participate in MA, it seems likely that a market for seamless transition into 
Medicare managed care will develop. 
 
 64. Id. at 1. 
 65. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, BUDGET OPTIONS VOL. I HEALTH CARE 122 (2008), available 
at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/99xx/doc9925/12-18-healthop 
tions.pdf; see also OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, A NEW ERA OF RESPONSIBILITY: RENEWING 
AMERICA’S PROMISE 28 (2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ 
omb/assets/fy2010_new_era/A_New_Era_of_Responsibility2.pdf. 
 66. Guest Post by Bryan Dowd, A Reply to Peter Orszag on Competitive Pricing in 
Medicare, NATIONAL REVIEW (Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.nationalreview.com/agenda/314 
704/guest-post-bryan-dowd-reply-peter-orszag-competitive-pricing-medicare-reihan-salam. 
 67. Landon et al., supra note 42, at 2613. 
 68. See Gold, supra note 43, at 1175; Guram & Moffit, supra note 52, at 1178-79. 
 69. Gold, supra note 43, at 1175. 
 70. See Berenson & Dowd, supra note 38, at w30-w33. 
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V.  REAL REFORM: MAKING MEDICARE ADVANTAGE WORK AND TRADITIONAL 
MEDICARE VIABLE 
The vacuous debate during the 2012 Presidential campaign over the 
premium support proposal left many voters with the misimpression that they 
were choosing between market competition and regulation as remedies for 
the Medicare cost problem. In reality, a flurry of regulation is well underway 
pursuant to the ACA. But that regulation is aimed at systemic change that 
could allow both FFS Medicare and MA or other market-based 
arrangements to flourish. These changes are squarely aimed at correcting 
the flaws of FFS Medicare payment policy and encouraging delivery system 
change that will support competitive markets for alternative methods of 
payment including, MA.71 Indeed, what is commonly overlooked is that FFS 
Medicare and MA (as well as new payment arrangements such as the 
Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP)) all require change in the way 
healthcare is organized and delivered to produce cost-effective, quality care. 
The ACA has initiated a large number of reforms in Medicare payment 
policies that aim to sharply refocus provider incentives and to encourage a 
fundamental reorganization of delivery of care. Some, like the MSSP, which 
encourages development of Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs), 
medical homes and financing changes such as bundled payments for 
certain diseases, are designed to deploy new payment incentives that will 
encourage the growth of seamless, efficient delivery systems.72 Others, such 
as changed payment policies for hospital readmissions, value based 
purchasing, and comparative effectiveness research, directly tackle flaws in 
the FFS system. If nothing else, this amalgam of pilots, experiments, and 
permanent programmatic reforms positions the government to rationalize 
Medicare based on evidence and experience.73 Perhaps the most intriguing 
possibility is that the MSSP will ease the transition from FFS payment to a 
market-based platform. The ACO concept, which rewards providers for 
 
 71. See Thomas L. Greaney, The Affordable Care Act and Competition Policy: Antidote or 
Placebo?, 89 OR L. REV. 811, 825-36 (2011) (discussing the elements of the ACA that advance 
competition at the provider and payer levels). 
 72. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH CARE REFORM; SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS 197-222 
(2012) (summarizing ACA’s changes to Medicare); PATRICIA A. DAVIS ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R41196, MEDICARE PROVISIONS IN THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: 
SUMMARY AND TIMELINE 26-27 (2011). 
 73. See Henry J. Aaron & Austin B. Frakt, Why Now is Not the Time for Premium Support, 
366 NEW ENG. J. MED. 877 (2012) (explaining that multiple reforms to Medicare enacted 
under the ACA will provide information needed to assess whether premium support or other 
reforms are needed); see also KAREN DAVIS, supra note 9, at 20 (citing ACA’s rapid and 
systematic testing of innovative models of payment and delivery as reason to maintain 
Medicare as a guaranteed benefit program). 
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accomplishing savings and delivering high quality care when done through 
integrative organizations, is built on a platform that retains FFS payment.74 
Some thorny questions remain. Can FFS Medicare coexist alongside MA 
and ACOs? In some ways the two approaches are complementary. MA 
assures that all beneficiaries receive the same minimum benefits and its 
beneficiaries are assured the right to return to traditional Medicare if they 
become dissatisfied with their private plans. FFS Medicare may come to look 
more like MA as providers join ACOs or otherwise configure themselves to 
respond to incentives for bundled payment and other reforms. Moreover, 
improvements in care processes, information collection, and effectiveness 
that may be realized in the competitive sector will have favorable spillover 
effects on FFS practices. 
At the same time, there are obstacles to realizing this rosy scenario. A 
critical issue is whether risk adjustment tools will prove adequate to prevent 
efforts to engage in favorable selection that could give MA plans an unfair 
advantage and ultimately make traditional Medicare unsustainable. 
Moreover, as discussed earlier, excessive cost control can lead to cost 
shifting to the private sector. On the other side of the coin, the commercial 
market is beset with inefficiencies and MA plans may find it impossible to 
offer cost-effective alternatives in markets dominated by monopolistic 
hospitals and specialty physician groups. Equally worrisome is the possibility 
that some ACOs may develop market power by combining competing 
providers in a single bargaining unit. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
It is fair to interpret the outcome of the 2012 Presidential election as a 
vote of confidence in traditional Medicare and rejection of an approach that 
would replace it entirely with private plans. Yet, the necessity of controlling 
overall spending remains the paramount challenge for ongoing debt 
reduction negotiations, and some combination of market-based incentives 
and price controls is necessary. In examining the failures of administered 
pricing and market competition to control costs thus far, this article has 
sought to warn against viewing either as a panacea. The regulatory missteps 
that have plagued both approaches provide a cautionary tale for future 
reforms. However, the ACA begins to move both in the right direction, 
 
 74. See Donald M. Berwick, Launching Accountable Care Organizations – The Proposed 
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perhaps setting in motion changes in provider organizations and in 
beneficiary expectations that will permit market forces to assume the pivotal 
role in controlling costs. 
 
